Live ChatIn March 2002, Sir Andrew Gregory was appointed Commander Royal Artillery within 1st (United Kingdom) Armoured Division. As the year progressed, the situation regarding Iraq deteriorated and the possibility of Britain going to war increased.
“It is always, and must always be, a political decision as to whether to deploy military force. The Armed Forces then advise the politicians about the military risks and opportunities; whether to go early without having all the ideal equipment and stocks in place but to seize an opportunity to exploit weaknesses in the enemy; or to wait longer and be better prepared but potentially to miss that opportunity?
“Additionally, there was a relatively small window of opportunity to invade Iraq linked to the availability of American carrier battle groups - how long they could stay on station to provide some of the essential air support, as well as moving before the height of the summer when temperatures become prohibitively hot for ground force operations. Hence, while by March 2003, most British forces for a possible invasion had arrived in theatre, we did not have every last item of kit that we needed but the potential window for ground operations was closing.
“it is not for me, as a soldier, to judge the rights and wrongs of political decisions, providing I believe the orders we are receiving are legal; I had no reason to doubt their legitimacy. My job then is to effect those orders as professionally and efficiently as possible, minimising casualties on all sides and ensuring that the least damage to civilian infrastructure occurred in the process of military operations. I can look anybody in the eye, especially those I was responsible for in 2003 and those I have worked with since, both in my subsequent military jobs and now with SSAFA, who have been badly affected by their experiences – and their families, and say, 'We did that.'”
There were casualties. There always are casualties”
“As a divisional headquarters, we started planning various scenarios and options dependent on political decisions in the latter part of 2002. Early in 2003, it was decided that, should Britain participate in any invasion of Iraq, we would be part of a southern axis, entering the country from Kuwait, and that we would be placed under command of the First United States Marine Corps Expeditionary Force (1 MEF). Consequently, the Divisional Commander, I and a very small team went to Kuwait in early January 2003 to meet the Americans and start our joint planning.
“However, even our visit was extremely sensitive as no political decisions had been made; it was important that even a small British presence was not seen as a premature escalation. The Government did commit to building up troops and equipment should they agree to join American forces in an invasion of Iraq but, as is well known, the political debates over whether we would participate went right to the wire. The Americans had plans both for us going with them or not. This political debate is a proper part of any military deployment; service personnel must learn to live with the uncertainty.”
British and American Forces crossed the border into Iraq on 23rd March 2003.
American forces led the crossing of the berms that ran along the Iraq-Kuwait border, seeking to secure the Rumaila oil fields of the West and the west bank of the Shatt al Arab waterway opposite Al Basrah in the centre. In the east, the British 3 Commando Brigade performed an air insertion onto the Al-Faw peninsula to secure critical oil infrastructure that would be vital for the future Iraqi economy.
Over the next few days, the Americans consolidated their position and moved westward towards Al Nasiriyah to continue their advance up towards Baghdad and the British forces took over the responsibility for the ground that had already been secured, particularly preparing for the entry into Al Basrah.
“We were quite clear that this couldn't become a street-by-street conflict. The civilian and British and Iraqi military casualties would be horrendous, as would the damage to the fabric of the city. It was very important that we waited for the right conditions to occur.
“War is an ugly business and , very sadly, there will always be individuals wounded and killed. We lost people when helicopters crashed and in the fighting outside Basrah and Al-Zubayr. While the numbers were smaller than our worst case scenarios, every loss is a tragedy and something felt by all of us in the force.
“Our planning definitely did not anticipate every situation that we faced. For example, because of our experiences in the Balkans, we assumed there might be a mass movement of people with refugee camps required. But in Iraq, people stayed put. After such a positive welcome from the population of southern Iraq, particularly because they were mainly Shia and had been heavily repressed under Saddam Hussein, we did not anticipate the intensity of the looting that immediately followed the liberation or of the insurgency that kicked off in the summer of 2003 and carried on for the next 4 or 5 years.
"This also resulted in a major IED threat, again not predicted, which resulted in snatch Land Rovers being deployed which were not fully up to the task but were the best option available at the time and before new vehicles could be procured. It was not ideal; in hindsight, could we have recognized better the likely aftermath of a very successful entry into Iraq? Possibly, but its very difficult ever to identify every contingency."
It contrasts massively with what we've watched over the last six horrendous months in Ukraine
“However, we did take our responsibilities to protect life extremely seriously; that obviously includes minimising casualties amongst our own people and minimising civilian causalities and also collateral damage to infrastructure and. And we aimed to minimise casualties amongst Iraqi forces; every life is precious.
“We had a list from American headquarters of 11,000 restricted or no fire zones that covered schools, hospitals, mosques and industrial sites where there could be a release of toxic chemicals. Around each location a 500m circle is placed to prevent damage – and by the time you've put 11,000 of these on your map, you haven't got many places left to engage the enemy!
“I worked with the divisional lawyer and together we developed an operational plan that ensured minimal destruction. If we were engaged from inside one of these areas, firstly a positive identification of Iraq forces was required. When that had been provided, the next question was whether it was necessary to engage them or could the troops do something else - bypass them or screen them with smoke? Finally, if engagement was necessary, was the response was proportionate? Procedures were followed and the targeting process worked well.
“That contrasts fundamentally with the Russian conduct of operations in Ukraine during the last year. There has been no attempt to minimize unnecessary damage; indeed, they appear deliberatively to have targeted civilians, residential areas, hospitals and schools and that is a war crime for which individuals should be held accountable.”
There was the worry, including fear of chemical weapons
Back in the UK, British military families were deeply affected by the decision to go to war. Sir Andrew’s own wife was one of them.
“Military deployments are easier for the person in theatre because they are absolutely focused on their job, they've got a single task, they've got structure around them and you don't really think that much about the risks, I know I didn't. It's much more difficult for the families left behind and it gets more difficult for those personnel who have done multiple tours. The news is delayed, or intermittent, their family don't know what's going on but rather are worrying whilst trying to run their lives but waiting for the dreaded knock on the door to tell them something has happened. That is unbelievably stressful.
“For me, there was sense of professional excitement and wanting to do my job as well as I could. For my wife Sally and all the other families, there was the worry, compounded to a degree by the threat of chemical weapons.”
In the South of Iraq, Sir Andrew remembers that the vast Shia Muslim population were welcoming to the coalition forces. For years they had been ruled by the Sunni Muslim Ba'ath party. Now there was a power vacuum, and someone had to step in.
“There had been a lot of oppression of the Shia Muslims down in the south, not least by draining the marshes and forcing the marsh Arabs (who had lived there for centuries) out of their homes and way of life.
“Any person in a position of responsibility had to be a member of the Ba'ath party, and a vacuum was created when the majority of these people disappeared.
“There was widespread looting, and warehouses were stripped of all their goods. This included food and items that needed to sustain a whole population.
“And now, there was no administration to run Basra, no local government for a city of 1.5 million people, or the province of Al-Basra and some of the Maysan and Al Nasiriyah.
It was down to me to put in place some effective Governance.”
“I was a soldier running a city of 1.5 million people. It was not my core skill set”
As the Deputy Commander, Sir Andrew met with locals and numerous Sheiks to set conditions and get agreement for the British forces to take over governance. Working on behalf of the General Officer Commanding, General Robin Brims, he had to ensure that security and stability was brought to the area.
“We did find some people to work with us in southern Iraq. By April 2003, we had found a way to start paying wages and to get the economy going again.
“I flew to Baghdad and came back with a huge pallet of cash stacked up – it is amazing what $39 million looks like in the flesh. That money was to pay 170,000 public sector employees.
“I was then to tasked to look more broadly at the local society which meant, for the last three months of my time in Iraq, I worked in Basrah and became part of the Coalition Provisional Authority.
“I was effectively made responsible for trying to reestablish a society. For example, I found myself in charge of the agricultural economy of southern Iraq.
“Date palms should have been sprayed in March to prevent mosquitoes becoming a prevalent problem. That hadn't happened because of the invasion. The tomato economy of southern Iraq is critical to the local farmers, and they should have planted their seeds under plastic poly tunnels as the fighting took place.
“We had to help them, otherwise they would have no crops to harvest in the autumn. There would be no food for the people.
“I was also tasked to look at the school education system. Iraqi children had critical exams in June, but schools had been looted. The curriculum was heavily skewed toward Ba'athist doctrine and so we had to look what we would do for this generation of children, so they didn't miss out.
“As a soldier, I am trained to deal with the unexpected, but running a city of 1.5 million people pushed me out of my comfort zone.
“I could have done with more civilian experts to support our efforts. Any invasion of a country like this is not a solely military activity, it is a whole society, cross government, exercise.”
The courage required to go out of that camp gate every day knowing that you're going to be targeted…
“When I was there, there was still an attitude of welcoming British forces and being grateful that Saddam Hussain was no longer gripping every aspect of life in southern Iraq.
“But months after the insurgency picked up and the majority of the 179 British service personnel who lost their lives on Operation Telic died in the violence after the invasion.
“The fighting during the invasion was difficult, there was some very intense periods, particularly in hot spots like Al-Zubair. People showed great courage, but perhaps even greater courage is that required to go out of that camp gate every day knowing that you're going to be targeted, knowing that there are improvised explosive devices waiting to detonate. That has a draining effect on those involved; while they showed great courage in Iraq, they now face difficulties as a result. As a nation, we have an enduring responsibility to look after those damaged physically and psychologically during this and any other conflict as well as supporting their families and the families of those killed for the rest of their days.”
No one's really thinking about Iraq victims anymore.
Twenty years after coalition forces invaded Iraq, SSAFA, the Armed Forces charity is appealing to the British public for renewed support for the service men and women and their families who carried out their duty – often with significant consequences. The charity is also calling for anyone affected by the war who may need help, to reach out to them.
“With the war in Iraq, we can debate all these grand issues – about the rights and wrongs. Do I think, knowing what I do now, that we should have gone to war? No, but it's easy to be wise in hindsight.
“But ultimately, what I do know, is we depended and will always depend on ordinary men and women being put into extraordinary circumstances, behaving in a manner where they uphold the values of their service.
“They looked after their comrades, looked after those they were fighting, looked after the civilian population and, in these very difficult circumstances, people got hurt – physically and mentally.
“We have a responsibility for them, on behalf of the nation. While the conflict was twenty years ago, the needs of some of these veterans and their families will endure into the future, even when they are not at the forefront of the Nation’s thoughts. The most difficult thing for many of them is to ask for help; they are too proud to do so. But SSAFA, the Armed Forces charity, is there for them, as we have been for the last 138 years. The greatest legacy I can now offer to those men and women I had the privilege of serving with in Iraq twenty years ago is to ensure we are there to be their trusted source of support in their time of need. I will do that with all my energy.”